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Cesena v. Du Page County: The Illinois Supreme
Court's Exercise of Equitable Jurisdiction and
Its Potential Impact on the Attorney-Client
Privilege
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation of our legal system exists in part on two compet-
ing principles: law and equity. History tells us that the legal and
equitable powers of the law once existed independently of each
other in two distinct court systems.' Courts required different pro-
cedures and pleadings depending on whether the remedy was
sought in equity or at law. Today, the jurisdiction of most modem
courts, state and federal, combines the equitable and legal powers
of the courts into one system.2 Where the system is fully merged,
as in Illinois, the pleading and evidentiary requirements are the
same. It is then within the judge's discretion to determine whether
the remedy should be fashioned around equitable principles or
whether it should be dictated by the common law.3
Common law and equity have distinct historic and symbolic im-
portance. The common law as it exists today, and as it existed
in England and the American Colonies prior to the American
Revolution, consists of principles and ideals central to the protec-
tion and security of an individual's person and property.4 Equity,
on the other hand, historically served to foster justice and fairness.5
In essence, an equitable remedy was available when the remedy
dictated by the common law either was inappropriate or
1. See infra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
2. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.6 (1973). The degree
of merger of law and equity varies among the states. Like the federal court system, Illi-
nois is one of the states that has merged law and equity into one court system. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-601 (1989) (originally enacted as Civil Practice Act of 1933,
1933 ILL. LAWS 792, and amended by Civil Practice Act of 1955, 1955 ILL. LAWS 2252).
3. See infra notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "common law").
5. Id. at 540 (defining "equity"); see DOBBS, supra note 2, § 2.1.
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inadequate.6
In modem courts where law and equity are merged, equitable
jurisdiction typically is not limited to those instances when a legal
remedy is inadequate. Instead, the adequacy of a legal remedy
serves only as one consideration for the court when it determines
whether it ought to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.7 In this re-
gard, judges are entrusted with a great sense of discretion to fash-
ion the appropriate remedy. If this judicial discretion is without
limitation, it may open the door to overreaching and abuse. The
flexibility of equitable jurisdiction may result in the awarding of
equitable remedies when adequate legal remedies exist and should
be granted. Such a practice may undermine well-established com-
mon law principles.
In a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Cesena v. Du Page
County,8 the court exercised its equitable jurisdiction and virtually
ignored the common law principle of the attorney-client privilege
as pled by the litigants at both the trial and appellate levels. The
supreme court, after hearing arguments centered specifically on the
issue of waiver of the privilege, reversed and remanded the case.9
The court's holding was in complete disregard of the lower courts'
rulings that the defendant attorney was in contempt of court for
failing to disclose his client's name.10 The supreme court in-
structed the lower court to consider the application of equitable
principles." By doing so, the court ignored some facts, assumed
others, potentially exceeded its jurisdictional powers, and left the
status of the attorney-client privilege in Illinois uncertain.
This Note will trace the separation and subsequent merger of
legal and equitable jurisdiction in both the federal and the Illinois
court systems. It will discuss the Illinois Supreme Court's equita-
ble jurisdiction and outline the constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law limitations on that power. Thereafter, the Note will
review the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cesena in light of
the court's role regarding its equitable jurisdiction, statutory au-
thority, and common law precedent. The Note then concludes
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "equity jurisdiction"); see
DOBBS, supra note 2, § 2.5.
7. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 2.6; see also Val H. Stieglitz, Note, The "Inadequacy of
Legal Remedy" Requirement for Equitable Relief: The Development of the Rule and Its
Application in South Carolina, 35 S.C. L. REv. 677, 685 (1984).
8. 582 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 1991).
9. Id. at 182.
10. Id. at 180.
11. Id. at 182.
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that when an equitable remedy is involved, the adage, "hard cases
make bad law," may apply.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Merger of Law and Equity
The first period of English equity, when courts of law and courts
of equity existed in one unified court system, lasted from approxi-
mately the thirteenth century to the mid-fourteenth century. 3
Cases were presented to the common law courts whether the rem-
edy sought was based in law or equity. 14 Since there were no pro-
cedural or jurisdictional distinctions, the court would fashion a
remedy in either law or equity, whichever the court deemed would
"do justice." A court's goal was to foster the "fair administration
of the law."1 5
Beginning in the late thirteenth century, the common law courts'
broad remedial power began to dissipate with the hardening of the
common law writ system. 6 By the late fourteenth and early fif-
teenth centuries, courts of equity and courts of law became two
distinct entities.17 The common law courts maintained stricter
rules of pleading, proof, and evidence than the equity or chancery
courts. While the typical remedy at law was a monetary award, in
equity or chancery courts the remedy was dictated by the con-
12. See Patricia Loughlan, No Right to the Remedy?: An Analysis of Judicial Discre-
tion in the Imposition of Equitable Remedies, 17 MELB. U. L. REV. 132, 134 (1989).
13. See Stieglitz, Note, supra note 7, at 678-79. Common law courts, acting in per-
sonam, issued injunctions in the form of writs of prohibition. Id. at 679. The remedies
issued were in accordance with the rights specified in the writs. Id. Typically, the writ
would require the recipient to desist from certain proscribed activities or to perform cer-
tain acts. Id. As long as the court granted the writ, the court would make no distinction
between an action in law or a suit in equity. Id. The Chancellor of England, a member of
the King's council similar to our Secretary of State, issued the common law writs. Id. at
680. Since it was within the discretion of the Chancellor to issue new writs and grant new
forms of relief, only the Chancellor's willingness to issue a writ controlled the extent to
which the common law could redress a party. Id.
14. Id. at 678.
15. Id. at 679.
16. Id. The divorce between law and equity began in the mid-1300s with the growing
rigidity of the common law writ system. Id. at 680. As early as 1258, statutes were
enacted that required the Chancellor to seek the consent of the King and his entire coun-
cil before issuing a writ. Id. The restrictions placed on the Chancellor's power to freely
issue writs converted the old common law system into a rigid, unresponsive, and inflexi-
ble system, abolishing any notion of discretion. Id. at 681; see also John A. Krause et al.,
Equitable and Extraordinary Remedies Seminar, ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RE-
GIONAL SEMINAR 1 (1981).
17. Stieglitz, Note, supra note 7, at 679; see DOBBS, supra note 2, § 2. 1.
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science of the Chancellor. I" Therefore, the relief the chancery
court granted addressed the moral conscience of the law and fos-
tered fairness, justice, and flexibility, unlike the remedies dictated
by the common law. 19
With the growing independence of the common law and equity
courts, a need arose to distinguish the jurisdictional limits of each
court. Generally, cases requiring an equitable remedy fell into two
categories: those in which equity served as the basis of the substan-
tive law, such as the law of trusts or mortgages; and those in which
the applicable common law remedy either was oppressive or
inadequate.20
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that a reform move-
ment swept through the English court system.21 The Judicature
Acts of 1873 and 1875 simplified procedures and practices in Eng-
lish law and subsequently abolished the distinctions between law
and equity.22
1. The History of Courts in the Early United States
The American colonial courts infrequently utilized their equita-
ble jurisdiction. 23 However, when the states enacted modern pro-
cedural statutes and law and equity were merged, the courts
revitalized their equitable jurisdiction.24 States enacted one of two
common schemes. 25 Some states followed the federal system com-
bining all civil actions into one "form of action," abolishing any
distinctions between law and equity.26 The other states, including
Illinois, followed the English scheme, maintaining the distinction
between actions in law and suits in equity and retaining separate
courts for each action. 27 The latter states, however, administer the
courts of law and equity in one court system governed by the same
18. Stieglitz, Note, supra note 7, at 681.
19. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 2.1.
20. Id.; see Stieglitz, Note, supra note 7, at 677-78.
21. See George P. Smith, II & Walter W. Nixon, III, La Dolce Vita-Law and Equity
Merged at Lastl, 24 ARK. L. REV. 162, 164 (1970).
22. Id.
23. See Krause et al., supra note 16, at 1.
24. Id.
25. See id.; see also RICHARD A. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL § 22.7 (1989) (discussing the merger of law and equity in the federal and
state courts, specifically in Illinois).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2; see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 67 (1983) (discussing the merger of law and equity in the federal courts).
27. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-601 (1989); see also GEORGE FIEDLER, THE
ILLINOIS COURTS IN THREE CENTURIES 238-41 (1973) (discussing the history and struc-
ture of Illinois courts).
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procedural code.28
2. The Equitable and Legal Powers of Illinois Courts
Illinois statutorily abolished the distinction between law and eq-
uity in the Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933, which was later
amended by the Civil Practice Act of 1955.29 It was not until Jan-
uary 1, 1964 that Illinois formally eliminated this distinction, when
the state legislature amended the 1870 Constitution by adopting an
entirely new Judicial Article, Article VI. This new article requires
only that a matter be justiciable in order to be within a circuit
court's jurisdiction.3 ° Since both actions at law and suits in equity
involve "justiciable" matters, a showing of either the presence or
absence of an adequate legal remedy is no longer required. 31 As a
result, the Illinois courts are free to fashion whatever remedy they
deem appropriate, either at law or in equity.
Unlike its description of the circuit court's jurisdiction, the
amended Judicial Article did not explicitly define the Illinois
Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Prior to the adoption of Section 5 of
the new article,32 the supreme court's review of appellate court de-
cisions was limited by statute.33 These restrictions were based on a
28. See MICHAEL, supra note 25, § 22.7.
29. See supra note 2. The Civil Practice Act provides in relevant part:
[T]here shall be no distinctions respecting the manner of pleading between ac-
tions at law and suits in equity.
Civil Practice Act of 1933, 1933 ILL. LAWS 792, amended by Civil Practice Act of 1955,
1955 ILL. LAWS 2252; see also FIEDLER, supra note 27, at 247-48.
30. Harry G. Fins, Re-examination of "Jurisdiction" in Light of the New Illinois Judi-
cial Article, 53 ILL. B.J. 8, 9-10 (1964). Prior to 1964 and the adoption of the new Judi-
cial Article to the 1870 Illinois Constitution, the circuit courts of Illinois possessed three
sources of jurisdiction: legal, equitable, and statutory. Id. Circuit courts had either a
judge at law or a chancellor in equity. Id. Litigants who filed a complaint in an equity
court were required to allege the non-existence of an adequate remedy at law before an
equitable remedy would be awarded. Id. at 11.
31. Id. at 11-12.
32. Section 5 of the amended Judicial Article provided, in part: "Subject to rules,
appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in all other cases shall be by
leave of the Supreme Court." ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 5 (amended 1964).
33. Fins, supra note 30, at 15. Also instructive is the Civil Practice Act of 1933, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 89 (1963) (repealed by 1967 ILL. LAWS 3654 in order to con-
form with the amended Article IV), which provided, in relevant part:
[Any final determination of any cause or proceeding tried without a jury, ex-
cept as to equitable issues, is made by the Appellate Court, as the result wholly
or in part of a finding of the facts, concerning the matter in controversy .... "
Id. (emphasis added). Another interesting provision is subsection 92(3)(b) of the Civil
Practice Act of 1933, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 92(3)(b) (1963) (repealed by 1967
ILL. LAWS 3654), which was repealed in order to conform to the amended Judicial Arti-
cle, and provided:
Error of fact, in that the judgment, decree or order appealed from is not sus-
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distinction between equitable and non-equitable issues.
After the adoption of Section 5, however, the supreme court's
jurisdiction covered both equitable and non-equitable review. The
amendment granted the supreme court unlimited authority to
handle appeals from the appellate court by giving the supreme
court the power to grant an appeal upon application by a party.a4
When Illinois ratified a new Constitution in 1970, a refined version
of Section 5 was included.35
3. The Legacy of the "Inadequacy of Legal Remedy" Rule
After the Merger of Law and Equity
As a result of the merger of law and equity, the "inadequacy of
legal remedy" rule no longer serves to define a court's jurisdic-
tion.36 Instead, the inadequacy rule now serves as a remedial con-
sideration to aid in the determination of whether the court ought to
exercise its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction.3
B. Equitable Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court's equitable jurisdiction must be de-
fined in light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the Constitution.
Well-established equity maxims, such as "equity considers that as
done which ought to be done," supply authority for the supreme
court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction in Illinois.3 s
Consistent with the broad grant of equitable jurisdiction, the
supreme court is not limited in the remedy it can award. Equitable
principles dictate that courts should not be "bound by formulas or
tamined by the evidence or is against the weight of the evidence, may be brought
up for review in any civil case: Provided that, except as to equitable issues, the
Supreme Court shall reexamine cases brought to it by appeal from the Appel-
late Courts, as to questions of law only.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 5 (amended 1964) (permitting appeals "by leave
of the Supreme Court" without any limiting reference to legal or equitable matters); see
supra note 32 (setting out the relevant text of § 5).
35. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4. Article VI, § 4 provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals from the Appellate Court
in other cases.
ILL. CONST. art VI, § 4. For a summary of Art. VI, § 4, see infra note 44. See generally
DAVID F. ROLEWICK, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 29 (Rev.
ed. 1971).
36. Stieglitz, Note, supra note 7, at 684-89.
37. Id. at 686-87; see DosS, supra note 2, § 2.5; Loughlan, supra note 12, at 134-35
("[fJudges in equity view their obligation as one of 'selecting the decision that is best on
the whole, all things considered.' " (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 71 (1977))).
38. See, e.g., Ward v. Sampson, 70 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ill. 1946).
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restrained by any limitation that tend to trammel the free and just
exercise of discretion."3 9 Accordingly, a court may fashion a rem-
edy to meet the demands of justice.4" For example, in Illinois, a
prayer for general relief is an appeal to the court to evaluate the
allegations and proof and then to grant such relief as the equities of
the case require.4' In essence, the court has the power to enter
whatever final judgment the record demonstrates should have been
entered by the lower court. 2 Such power, however, should not be
considered limitless.
When the court has assumed jurisdiction for the purpose of
granting equitable relief, it may determine all the issues presented
by the case, whether legal or equitable. "3 There are, however, con-
stitutional, statutory, and common law limitations that may pre-
clude a court from deciding any or all of the issues of a particular
case, even on equitable grounds.
1. Implicit Constitutional and Common Law Limitations
Although the Illinois Constitution does not explicitly limit the
supreme court's jurisdiction to cases and controversies, 44 Illinois
courts are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions or con-
ducting proceedings with insufficient legal standing.45 Jurisdiction
is restricted to cases that present an actual controversy; the court
39. Cesena v. Du Page County, 582 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ill. 1991); City of Aurora v.
YMCA, 137 N.E.2d 347, 353 (Ill. 1956); County of Du Page v. Henderson, 83 N.E.2d
720, 728 (Ill. 1949).
40. See, e.g., Hoyne Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 322 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ill. 1974);
Pope v. Speiser, 130 N.E.2d 507, 513 (Ill. 1955).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604 (1989). Section 2-604 provides in pertinent
part:
[T]he prayer for relief does not limit the relief obtainable, but where other relief
is sought the court shall, by proper orders, and upon terms that may be just,
protect the adverse party against prejudice by reason of surprise.
Id.; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 366 (1989) (setting forth the powers of Illinois
reviewing courts).
42. See, e.g., City of Aurora, 137 N.E.2d at 353.
43. See, e.g., McLeod v. Lambdin, 174 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ill. 1961).
44. Article IV, § 4 does not explicitly state that the jurisdiction of the Illinois
Supreme Court is limited to cases and controversies. Section 4(a) grants the court origi-
nal jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus;
§ 4(b) grants appellate jurisdiction from circuit court decisions imposing sentence of
death; and § 4(c) grants appellate jurisdiction for decisions of the appellate courts if a
question under the Constitution of the United States or of Illinois arises for the first time
in appellate courts or if the appellate court certifies a case because the question involved is
of great importance. The supreme court may also provide by rule for appeals from the
appellate court in other cases. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
45. See People ex reL Partee v. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Il. 1990); see also
People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 449 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ill. 1983) (explaining that Illinois
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may not issue an advisory opinion on moot or abstract questions of
law. 6 An advisory opinion results if the court resolves a question
of law that is not presented by the facts of the case.47
2. Statutory Limitations on Equitable Jurisdiction
Statutory enactments place further restrictions on Illinois courts.
For example, a court has the authority to issue a declaratory judg-
ment only in particular situations.4 The Illinois Declaratory Judg-
ment Act49 permits declaratory relief only in justiciable cases and
only when an actual controversy exists.5 0 Illinois courts have de-
fined "actual controversy" as requiring " 'a showing that the un-
derlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature.' ,"
Absent such proof, the court would be passing judgment on ab-
stract propositions of law, rendering advisory opinions, and giving
legal advice as to future events-actions going beyond the scope of
jurisdiction granted under the Illinois Constitution.5 2 Thus, there
must be "a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and defini-
tive determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of which
will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part
thereof. ' 53 The ultimate grant or denial of declaratory relief, how-
ever, falls within the discretion of the court.54
courts should not decide cases when the judgments rendered would be ineffectual for lack
of subject matter and would have advisory effect only).
46. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d at 1001; see Dukes, 449 N.E.2d at 857; In re Marriage of
Wright, 434 N.E.2d 293, 293 (Ill. 1982); Underground Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chi-
cago, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ill. 1977).
A case is considered moot when it does not present or involve an actual controversy,
interest, or right of a party or parties, or when issues cease to exist. People v. Boclair, 519
N.E.2d 437, 439 (I11. 1987); People v. Redlich, 83 N.E.2d 736, 741 (I11. 1949).
47. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d at 1001; see Slack v. City of Salem, 201 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill.
1964).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (1989); see, e.g., Township High School
Dist. 203 v. Village of Northfield, 540 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. 1989) (dismissing a declaratory
judgment because the plaintiff's interests would be adversely affected only if some future
possibility did or did not occur).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (1989).
50. Id.
51. Howlett v. Scott, 370 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Ill. 1977) (quoting Underground Con-
tractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Il1. 1977)).
52. Underground Contractors Ass'n, 362 N.E.2d at 300; see supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
53. Underground Contractors Ass'n, 362 N.E.2d at 300.
54. Howlett, 370 N.E.2d at 1038-39.
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III. CESENA V. Du PAGE COUNTY 55
The attorney-client privilege, an age-old common law doctrine,
is firmly imbedded in our legal system.5 6 With its underlying pur-
pose of encouraging the free and open communication between the
client and the attorney, the privilege is critical to the furtherance of
a litigant's rights.5 7 The practical effect of the privilege may be
threatened by the limitless exercise of judicial equitable discretion.
This is what the Illinois Supreme Court did in Cesena v. Du Page
County.
A. The Facts of Cesena
On September 28, 1987, "John Doe," while driving an automo-
bile on an interstate highway, struck and killed a pedestrian,
Timothy Golden, without stopping at the scene of the accident."
Approximately one hour and forty-five minutes after the accident,
John Doe met his attorney, Jeffrey Fawell, at Fawell's office.59
Fawell explained to his client that failure to stop at the scene of the
accident constituted a misdemeanor under Chapter 11 of The Illi-
nois Vehicle Code ("Hit and Run Statute" or "Statute").' Fur-
thermore, under the Statute's reporting provision, John Doe had
only 3 hours from the time of the accident to file an accident report
to avoid being subject to criminal felony charges.6'
. Shortly after the accident, Fawell and Doe went to the Du Page
County Sheriff's Office to file an accident report pursuant to sec-
tion 11-401(b) of the Statute.62 Since the accident occurred on an
interstate highway, the Sheriff's deputy informed Fawell that the
55. 582 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 1991).
56. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
57. Id.; see Dickerson v. Dickerson, 153 N.E. 740, 743 (Ill. 1926); People ex rel. Hofp
v. Barger, 332 N.E.2d 649, 658 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1975).
58. Cesena v. Du Page County, 582 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ill. 1991).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-401(b) (1989)). Illinois's Hit and
Run Statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person who has failed to stop or comply with [the hit and run statute] shall
within 3 hours after such motor vehicle accident .... report the place of the
accident, the date, the approximate time, the driver's name and address, the
registration number of the vehicle driven, and the names of all other occupants
of such vehicle, at a police station or sheriff's office near the place where such
accident occurred. No report made as required under this paragraph shall be
used, directly or indirectly, as a basis for the prosecution of any violation of
[this statute].
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-401(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
61. Cesena, 582 N.E.2d at 179.
62. Id.
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report must be filed with the Illinois State Police Department.6 3 In
the interest of time, Fawell attempted to convince the deputy to
accept the report, but was unsuccessful." The deputy then errone-
ously informed Fawell that time was not a pressing issue, telling
Fawell that Doe had forty-eight hours to file the accident report
with the Illinois State Police.65 Fawell and Doe left the Du Page
County Sheriff's Office without either filing the report or revealing
John Doe's true identity.66
Back at his office, Fawell called the Illinois State Police to in-
form them, for "humanitarian reasons," of the location and time of
the accident.67 Fawell, however, never disclosed the identity of his
client.68 Soon after, Fawell received several telephone calls: one
from the Illinois State Police and two from Du Page County Assis-
tant State's Attorneys, all requesting disclosure of his client's iden-
tity. 69 Fawell refused to comply with these requests, asserting that
his client made a timely accident report in full compliance with the
reporting provisions of the Statute.70 If Fawell disclosed John
Doe's identity at that time, his client would have been subject to
felony charges due to the failure to file a timely accident report.I
The Du Page County State's Attorney commenced a grand jury
investigation and issued a subpoena compelling Fawell to reveal
details of the accident, to reveal the identity of his client, and to
submit the written statement that he had attempted to file at the
sheriff's office.7 2 Fawell filed a motion to quash the subpoena, as-
serting that the communications between him and his client fell
within the attorney-client privilege.73 The trial court granted his
motion. 74
On September 28, 1988, the plaintiff, the administrator of
Timothy Golden's estate, filed a suit against Du Page County and
the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Du Page County alleging negli-
gence in failing to accept John Doe's accident report.75 The failure
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id. at 182.
72. Id. at 179-80.
73. Id. at 180.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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to file the accident report left Doe's identity unknown, thus deny-
ing the estate of Timothy Golden the ability to pursue its legal
rights.76 During a discovery deposition taken in connection with
this litigation, Fawell continued to refuse to answer questions relat-
ing to his client's identity and the accident report, consistently as-
serting the attorney-client privilege."'
On August 28, 1989, after the plaintiff filed motions to compel,
the trial court ordered Fawell to respond to the deposition ques-
tions.7" The next day, after Fawell refused and the court denied his
motion to reconsider, the court found him in contempt, incarcer-
ated him, and fined him $1,000 per day until he responded to the
questions.79
B. The Appellate Court Decision
The Second District Illinois Appellate Court decision focused on
the attorney-client privilege and its applicability to the facts of the
case.8 0 The appellate court held that an attorney-client privilege
existed between Fawell and his client.8 ' The court, however, ac-
knowledged that this privilege was not absolute.8 2
After a thorough analysis of the exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege, 3 the appellate court held that John Doe's identity was
protected by the privilege because if his identity were disclosed, he
would suffer undue prejudice.8 4 However, this conclusion did not
end the appellate court's analysis. The issue of waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege became the factor determinative of Fawell's
fate. 85
The waiver issue focused on whether, by attempting to file a re-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Cesena v. Du Page County, 558 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990).
Faweil was later released on his own recognizance, but the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's contempt finding. Id. at 1390. The appellate court, however, did reduce the
fine to$ 100 per day. Id.
80. Id. at 1338.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court proposed that the client's expectation that the communications
would remain confidential must be balanced with the public's interest in the disclosure of
the evidence. Id. The court also recognized that a client's identity generally is not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege unless the protection of the client's identity is in the
public interest or if the disclosure of the client's identity will prejudice the client in "some
substantial way." Id. at 1384.
83. Id. at 1383-84.
84. Id. at 1384.
85. Id. at 1385.
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port pursuant to the Statute, 6 John Doe intended to waive his at-
torney-client privilege by disclosing his identity to a third party,
the Du Page County Deputy Sheriff. 7 Fawell, however, main-
tained that because the Statute compelled John Doe to disclose his
identity in order to avoid criminal prosecution, the disclosure was
involuntary and, therefore, did not constitute a waiver of the privi-
lege."8 The appellate court rejected this argument and held that
John Doe did not intend, at least on the night in question, to keep
his name confidential.8 9
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court granted Fawell's petition for leave to
appeal. 90 The court reversed and remanded the case with instruc-
tions, setting aside both the trial court's and the appellate court's
orders finding Fawell in contempt and imposing fines.91
The supreme court's decision rested on the injustice that would
result to both John Doe and the plaintiff-estate if the case were
resolved according to the lower courts' rationale. 92 If Fawell were
required to reveal John Doe's identity due to a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege as held by the appellate court, then John Doe
would be subject to felony charges for failing to file a timely acci-
dent report.93 If Fawell did not disclose his client's identity, the
plaintiff-estate would be unable to exercise its legal right to main-
tain a civil action against John Doe.94 Therefore, the supreme
court held that the equities of the case required the exercise of its
equitable jurisdiction. 95 The court intended to place all parties in
the positions they would have occupied had the Sheriff's Deputy
accepted the accident report.96 In essence, Doe would be subject
only to misdemeanor charges rather than criminal felony charges,
86. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
87. Cesena, 558 N.E.2d at 1385.
88. Id. at 1386.
89. Id. at 1387. The court's discussion then focused on whether, in consideration of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, it would have been ethical for Fawell to reveal the
identity of his client. Id. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the Du Page County
Circuit Court's contempt ruling and ordered Fawell to answer the deposition questions.
Id. at 1390.
90. Cesena v. Du Page County, 564 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1990) (Table).
91. Cesena v. Du Page County, 582 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ill. 1991).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme
Court's equitable jurisdiction).
96. Cesena, 582 N.E.2d at 182. The court has long held that equity has jurisdiction
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and the plaintiff-estate would be informed of Doe's identity, thus
allowing any civil claims resulting from Timothy Golden's death to
proceed.
In reaching its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
two of the three jurisdictional sources of a court. First, the court
justified its holding in light of its broad remedial power to fashion a
remedy in equity. Second, it justified its decision in light of the
statutory scheme and legislative history of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, specifically the Hit and Run Statute.9 The court, however,
failed to consider the application and importance of the third
source of jurisdiction, the common law, and, more specifically, the
effect of its decision on the common law doctrine of the attorney-
client privilege.
IV. ANALYSIS
Maxims of equity serve to define a court's equitable jurisdiction,
jurisdiction that is characterized historically as a source of fairness
and flexibility.98 However, being theoretical and postulative, these
maxims empower a court with limitless discretion. If the parame-
ters of a court's equitable remedial powers remain limitless, there is
the potential for a court to misuse its equitable jurisdiction under
the guise of justice.
A. Does Equity Sanction a New Role For the Courts?
1. The Court as "Creator of Facts"
In keeping with the equitable maxim, "equity considers that as
done that ought to be done," 99 it seems that a court is licensed to
do whatever is necessary to achieve a remedy that imparts "full
and complete justice among all parties."' ° Axiomatically, equity
tolerates a court's alteration of facts in the name of justice. This
assessment should be considered in light of the common under-
to correct the mistake of a county ministerial officer. See, e.g., Thornton, Ltd. v.
Rosewell, 381 N.E.2d 249, 253 (I11. 1978); Foster v. Clark, 79 Ill. 225, 227 (1875).
97. Cesena, 582 N.E.2d at 180-81 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 11-401,
11-403 (1989)). The legislative intent underlying the statute was to encourage a driver
involved in a hit and run accident, to come forward and report the accident to the author-
ities. Id. at 181. To encourage this, the statute offers a trade-off: information on the
accident within a certain period of time in exchange for a misdemeanor charge rather
than a criminal felony charge. Id.
98. See supra notes 13-54 and accompanying text (discussing the historical context
and significance of equitable jurisdiction).
99. See, e.g., Ward v. Sampson, 70 N.E.2d 324, 331 (I11. 1946).
100. See, e.g., Alter v. Moellenkamp, 179 N.E.2d 4 (II1. 1961).
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standing that a court's function is to apply the law to a controversy
or set of controversies brought before it to further the administra-
tion of justice. 0 1
In Cesena, the issue was whether an attorney was obligated to
disclose the name of his client despite assertion of the attorney-
client privilege.102 The court determined that the equities of the
case did not require an interpretation of the extent of the attorney-
client privilege, but rather, required a reassessment of the "real"
issue: whether the Sheriff's deputy should have accepted the acci-
dent report that Fawell and John Doe attempted to file.10 3 Essen-
tially relying on its equitable jurisdiction to correct the mistake of a
county ministerial officer, the court assumed, for purposes of fair-
ness, that the deputy accepted the accident report.' °4 Justice Bi-
landic, who wrote the opinion in Cesena, expressly justified the
decision on the court's statutory authorization to shape a remedy
that meets the demands of justice in all cases.' 5
Arguably, the decision promoted justice between the parties in
this particular set of circumstances. At the same time, however, it
sanctioned a new role for the Illinois Supreme Court, as "creator of
facts." The court assumed that the accident report had been ap-
propriately filed. By doing so, the court created a situation that
never existed. Encouragement of such a role as "creator of facts,"
merely to accommodate a remedy, could jeopardize the whole no-
tion of precedent and consistency in the law.
2. The Court as Legislature
Under the Illinois Constitution, the legislature is empowered to
draft legislation with the goal of fostering or furthering a specific
public policy.' °6 The courts have authority to interpret those stat-
utes, not to rewrite them.' °7 In Cesena, the court's equitable reso-
lution rested on the assumption that John Doe filed the accident
report within the three hour time limitation set by the Statute. The
Statute's language explicitly states that a person involved in a hit
and run accident "shall, within 3 hours after such motor vehicle
101. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "court").
102. Cesena v. Du Page County, 582 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ill. 1991).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105. Cesena, 582 N.E.2d at 180.
106. ILL. CONsT. art. IV; see also People ex rel Tuohy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 64
N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ill. 1946).
107. See ILL. CONST. art. VI; Droste v. Kerner, 217 N.E.2d 73, 79, (III. 1966), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 456 (1967); Fergus v. Marks, 152 N.E. 557, 559 (Ill.
1926); Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 218 N.E.2d 27, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1966).
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accident,... report."'0°  This language requires an actual filing of
an accident report; nowhere does it allow a hypothetical filing of a
report to be considered in compliance with the statute's provisions.
It is not the role of the courts to add language or flexibility to a
statute. If the legislature had intended to allow such flexibility, it
would have indicated this in the Statute's language. Accordingly,
the supreme court's remedial powers grounded in equity should
not be utilized to expand the legislative grant when expansion was
not intended. If they are so utilized, statutory authority is not only
undermined, but superfluous.
B. The Requirement of an "Actual Controversy" May Preclude
Fashioning a Remedy in Equity
Generally, it is not within a court's jurisdiction to issue advisory
opinions." Accordingly, a court is restricted to the resolution of
the issues presented by the facts that are in "actual controversy.""°
Issues that are moot or that have not been presented to the court
cannot be decided by the court."' Similarly, a judgment based on
hypothetical facts or situations results in an advisory opinion.,1 2
Thus, equity cannot justify an advisory opinion when it would
otherwise be prohibited.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Cesena did not decide the actual
controversy presented. The issue before the court concerned the
appellate court's ruling on the attorney-client privilege, particu-
larly the issue of waiver of the privilege, as it applied to the facts of
the case. Instead of resolving this issue, the court chose other facts
remotely related to the immediate controversy.' 1 3 Given the pos-
ture of the case, however, such facts were moot.' "4 Therefore, the
court essentially issued an advisory opinion on facts that were
108. See supra note 60 (giving relevant text of the reporting provision of the Illinois
Hit and Run Statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110, para. 11-401(b) (1989)).
109. See, e.g., People ex. reL Partee v. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Ill. 1990);
supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
110. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d at 1001; see also supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
112. Murphy, 550 N.E.2d at 1001; see Slack v. City of Salem, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121
(Ill. 1964).
113. Cesena v. Du Page County, 582 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ill. 1991). Instead of focusing
on the issue of the attorney-client privilege as pled by the litigants, the court chose to
consider the issue of whether or not the accident report was filed appropriately and
timely. Id.
114. The issue of whether the deputy made an error at the county level should have
been considered moot for purposes of determining whether Fawell was correct in assert-
ing the attorney-client privilege in order to avoid revealing the identity of his client.
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characteristically hypothetical.' 15 Interpreting equity to enable a
court to alter facts allows the court to exceed its statutorily author-
ized power, thus rendering Illinois' declaratory judgment statute 16
meaningless.
C. Equity May Undermine the Common Law
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest privileges of
confidential communication known at common law. 1 7 The pur-
pose of the privilege is to encourage free and open consultation and
communication between client and attorney without fear of com-
pelled disclosure of the information. 8 In this regard, the privilege
is essential to the proper and effective functioning of the adversary
system."19 While it is not an absolute privilege even when it ap-
plies, 2 ' the attorney-client privilege is a doctrine firmly imbedded
in our common law and cannot be disregarded merely at the dis-
cretion of the court.
In Cesena, the court chose to ignore the issue of whether the
communication between attorney and client, specifically the cli-
ent's identity, should remain confidential. The appellate court's
holding on the issues of whether the privilege existed and whether
the client waived this privilege appeared inconsequential to the
supreme court's determination. As a result, the court deemed the
attorney-client privilege a secondary consideration.
Cesena directly undermines the attorney-client privilege under
the guise of justice. It is unclear how this decision fosters justice
115. For purposes of equity, the court assumed that the Du Page County Sheriff's
deputy accepted John Doe's accident report. However, as evident from the facts of the
incidents occurring on the night in question, this was not the case. Cesena, 582 N.E.2d at
182.
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (1989); see supra notes 48-54 and accom-
panying text.
117. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 56, § 2290; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1978).
118. People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d 205 (Ill.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Knief
v. Sotos, 537 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
119. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (A "central concern [of the
attorney-client privilege is] 'to encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.' " (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)).
120. The attorney-client privilege is not absolute. The appropriateness of its applica-
tion in a given situation must be determined by weighing the interest in free and open
communication between attorney and client without fear of compelled disclosure against
the public's interest in obtaining evidence. Taylor v. Taylor, 359 N.E.2d 820, 821 (Ill.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977); see also People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d. 205, 207 (Ill. 1972) (pro-
viding the definition, requirements for, and exceptions to the attorney-client privilege).
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when it subverts one of the client's most critical and basic rights.
The fair and effective functioning of a just legal system rests on the
ability of clients and attorneys to communicate freely and
openly.' In this regard, how can a court be justified in disregard-
ing and minimizing the importance, essence, and foundation of the
common law?
V. IMPACT
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cesena v. Du Page
County left undecided the issue of whether a law, such as the Hit
and Run Statute, 2 2 can supersede the attorney-client privilege.
While the appellate court attempted to resolve this issue, the
supreme court ignored it, even though the facts of the case de-
manded its resolution.
The broad effect of the decision concerns the role and extent of a
court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction. To allow a court, through
the pretense of equity, to "rewrite" the facts of a case rather than
to resolve the actual controversy in light of the law, is to sanction
an entirely new role for the judicial system. Equity cannot be
thought of as a "catch-all" source of power that can supersede the
long-standing role of statutory and common law authority. If this
were the case, then other principles, central to the functioning of
litigation and the preservation of an individual's rights, are open to
abuse by the courts under the guise of "equity."
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should not be permitted to exercise their equitable juris-
diction to the exclusion of other principles grounded in our legal
system. While equity seeks to do justice and accommodate fair-
ness, the true sense of these ideals can be fostered only if the limita-
tions on the court's discretion are defined. Simply, the three
sources of a court's jurisdiction---common law, equity, and stat-
ute-must co-exist and be harmonized to the extent possible.
The purpose of equitable jurisdiction is to supply a remedy that
will foster justice to all parties involved. However, the exercise of
such jurisdiction, while discretionary in the court, should not be
encouraged when an adequate remedy at law exists. While the
existence of an adequate legal remedy is not fully decisive, it is a
121. See supra notes 56-57, 117-120 and accompanying text.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-401(a)-(d) (1989); see supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
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consideration that the court should take seriously before utilizing
its extraordinary powers. The failure of a court to do so may jeop-
ardize the common law in later cases.
It is difficult to justify the "equitable" decision in Cesena v. Du
Page County in light of the court's historical role and the existence
of an adequate remedy at law. 12 3 Admittedly, the supreme court's
decision was fair to the specific parties concerned. However, it sets
a dangerous precedent for the resolution of future cases. Cesena
expands the court's discretion to new levels, setting the stage for
the court to undermine other common law doctrines. The Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Cesena v. Du Page County falls within
the category of hard cases making bad law.
AMY KUSHEN
123. In Cesena, the adequate remedy at law stemmed from a determination of
whether John Doe waived the attorney-client privilege when he and Fawell attempted to
file the accident report with the Du Page County Deputy Sheriff. Whether the privilege
had been waived was determinative of whether Fawell would have been required to dis-
close his client's name to the plaintiff.
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